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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

No. 8756

EDWARD E. McHENRY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT
The defendant was convicted of the crime of robbing
Wallace E. Naylor, General Manager of the Safeway
Store, located at 17th South and 4th East, Salt Lake City,
Utah, on the 16th day of February, 1957, and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate
term as provided by law for the crime of robbery as
charged (R. 6, 12, 24).
The facts as presented to the Trial Court are sufficient to prove that a robbery was committed on the day
and at the place above mentioned. The defendant denies,
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however, that he committed the robbery and alleges that
there is not sufficient competent evidence to prove that
he committed the same.
This appeal is directed to the insufficiency of the
evidence to connect the defendant with the crime committed; to the admissibility of the evidence offered to
identify the accused and to the admissibility of certain
exhibits and other evidence which prejudiced the defendant and denied him the right to a fair trial.
The defendant is impecunious, was and now is represented by court appointed counsel (R. 7).
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.

STATEMEXT OF FACTS
Thoughout the entire trial of this case the State was
allowed, over the objection of the defendant (R. 17) to
introduce evidence of a wholly independent and unrelated
crime. The court in overruling the defendant's objection
admitted the evidence for the purpose of identification
only (R. 17-18).
l\fr. Naylor described the defendant as being about
5'10" tall, weighing around 160 pounds, with a little different talk than Inost fellows and with a blood spot in the
corner of his right eye (R. 16). Even though he had given
such a vivid description of the defendant, the court, over
the objection of the defendant, permitted hini to testify
concerning a previous robbery on the 11th day of Februar~r, 1957 (R. 18). The court permitted this evidence for
the purpose of identification only (R. 17).
The tP~ti11wn~· of 1\Ir. Naylor concerning the crime
of February 11th did not show any connection between
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that crime and the one which the defendant wa.s being
tried for, and did in no way legally identify the defendant. The evidence merely shows that Mr. Naylor was
robbed on February 11th by two persons dressed similarly. During the robbery of February 11th the assailants
approached their victim outside of the store, forced him
to enter and attempted to force him to open the safe (R.
90-110)._ The robbery of February 16th was committed
by two persons who gained entrance through the roof of
the .store (R. 13, 39).

Mr. Naylor claimed to be able to describe his assailant by reason of the observations made on the 16th day
of February, 1957, from a line-up at the Police Station
at noon on that day. He was able to pick out the defendant as one of his assailants. He identified the defendant
by reason of a blood spot in his right eye and by reason
of hi.s voice and size (R. 21).
The entire testimony of one of the State's witnesses,
Oliver Nickel, who was the produce clerk employed by the
Safeway Store above mentioned, pertained to a robbery
at the s.ame store on the 11th day of February, 1957 (R.
90-110). From a casual observation of Mr. Nickel's testimony it becomes obvious that the same does not in any
way add to the identification of the defendant. Mr.
Naylor was permitted to so testify even though he was
not present at the time the second robbery took place
(R. 95-96). Mr. Naylor's first contact with the defendant
was at noon on February 16th at the Police Station (R.
97-98). His testimony identified the defendant as being
the {)Brson in the store on February 11th, but he did
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not identify the defendant as being the person in the store
on February 16th (R. 98).
A Mercury automobile containing a suitcase with
two 22-calibre revolvers, both loaded, was found parked
on Westminster A venue just east of 4th East and approximately two blocks from the scene of the crime (R.
129-131, Exhibits 13 and 14). Over the objection of the
defendant, Lyman S. Burton, one of the State's witnesses,
was permitted to testify concerning the ownership of
the automobile and its contents (R. 129-132). The only
evidence offered as to the ownership of the automobile
and its contents is the testimony of Officer Burton, which
is as follows :

"Q.

Did you make an investigation to determine
the ownership of the car~

A.

Well, it had temporary stickers on it. It had
not had license plates yet. It was newly purch~sed and had temporary stickers on it. I
read the name on those.

Q.

Did the sticker show the registered owner'

A.

It did.

Q. What was the name of the registered owner?
MR. WOOLLEY: Objected to as hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A.

Edw,ard McHenry.

Q.

(1\fr. Child) Did you gain access to the car?

A.

I did.

Q. Did you find ,anything inside of it'
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A. Yes, there was a sport coat.MR. WOOLLEY: We object to this line of
questioning your Honor. It is irrelevant and
immaterial, and has not been connected up
with this case 1
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
A.

There was a sport coat, a p.air of slacks, and
in the back seat, on the floor, was a suitcase
and then there were miscellaneous things in
there, flashlight, and can openers, I do not
recall.

Q.

(Mr. Child) I will show you what has been
marked as Exhibit 15 and ask you if you can
identify that 1

A.

Yes, that is the suitcase which was on the
back, on the floor of the back seat of the
'57 Mercury.

Q.

Did you open the suitease at that time 1

A.

Not at that time. I did not open it until I
took it to the police station.

Q.

Did you then open it 1

A.

I did.

Q.

What did you find inside, if anything 1

A.

Two 22-calibre revolvers, and both fully loaded, and I believe there was a picture, but 1
don't remember, in the little carrie·r in the
suit case, where you put handkerchiefs and
things like that. That was all that was in the
suitcase."

Exhibits 13 and 14 were later admitted in evidence
over the objection of the defendant (R. 133).
Following the defendant's arrest he was taken to the
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interrogation office at the Police Station and interrogated by Officer Clore and Officer Fillis (R. 149-150).
Officer Fillis was permitted to testify as to statements
made by Officer Clore to him concerning the robbery
and the .apprehension of the defendant (R. 150-151).
Officer Fillis made certain threatening statements to th~
defendant which caused the defendant to make admissions against his own will, which admissions Officer Fillis
was permitted to testify to (R. 152-153, 160). In this
connection the record is as follows:
Cro.ss examination
"Q.

Then I believe it was about then you stated,
'Look Buddy, we can do this two ways, the
easy way or the hard way' and you took about
two steps toward me and said, 'I would just
as soon do it the hard way.'
Isn't that true~

A.

I do not recall any threats being made whatsoever.

Q. Didn't Mr. Clore state in the preliminary that
you said that?
A. What Mr. Clore testified to I cannot testify
to."
Redirect examination
"Q.

Were there any threats of any type used in
the interrogation room against Mr. Edward
McHenry, the defendant here, in your presence?
A. Not in my presence, no, sir.

Q. Is it possible you said, 'We can either do this
the easy way or the hard way'?
A. It is very possible.
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Q. If you said that, why did you say
A.

it~

In any type of work there is always an easier
way to do things. The easy way in this instance would have been for him to tell us,
as we asked, a particular question, so we
could go out and check, rather than go out
and bit by bit pull in witnesses and evidence,
such as we had to do in this case."

This appeal is directed at the errors committed by
the trial court in admitting evidence of a wholly independent and unrelated crime, in admitting evidence as to
the owner.ship of a certain automobile and its contents,
and in permitting testimony concerning statements allegedly Inade by the defendant under compulsion, all of
which prejudiced the jury and denied defendant the right
of a fair and impartial trial.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
OF AN INDEPENDENT AND UNRELATED CRIME.
POINT II.
THE ·COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
CONCERNING A MERCURY AUTOMOBILE AND ITS CONTENTS.
POINT III.
STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT MADE UNDER
COMPULSION WERE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
OF AN INDEPENDENT AND UNRELATED CRIME.
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The court in admitting evidence of a robbery which
allegedly occurred on the 11th day of February, 1957, at
the same place as the crime of February 16, 1957, prejudiced the defendant and denied him the right to a fair
and impartial trial. Evidence of independent and unrelated crimes is inadmissible and prejudicial. This rule
is so universally recognized and so firmly established
that citation of authoritie.s to support the same is unnecessary. It is the product of that same humane and enlightened public spirit which has decreed that every person charged with the commission of a crime shall be
protected by the presumption of innocence until he is
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There are certain exceptions to this rule which state that evidence of
another crime is competent to prove the specific crime
charged when it tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent,
( 3) the absence of mistake or accident, ( 4) a common
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one
tends to establish the other, and (5) the identity of the
person charged with the commission of the crime on
trial.
The court in the in.stant case admitted evidence of
other crimes for the purpose of establishing the identity
of the accused. Such evidence has been admitted and
found competent in almost every court in the United
States, including our own in the case of State v. Marti-n
(1917), 49 Utah 346, 164 P. 500. If, however, the identity
has been otherwise clearly made out, such evidence should
not be introduced, since, in such case, it could have no
other effect than to prejudice the defendant by estab-
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Iishing his guilt of an independent crin1e. ±2 A.L.R. 2d
862.
In order for evidence to be competent to prove
identity the evidence of the independent crime must be
connected as a part of a general and composite scheme
or plan. Some connection between the crime must be
shown to have existed in fact and in the mind of the actor
uniting them for the accomplishment of a common purpose. This connection must be clearly apparent from the
evidence. To allow the evidence otherwise would be to
poison and prejudice the minds of the jurors by the use
of irrelevant and dangerous deception. The admissibility
of this type of evidence must rest on the facts in each
case. There cannot be many cases where evidence of
separate and distinct crimes will serve to legally identify
the person who committed the crime as the s.ame person
who is guilty of another. It is much easier to believe
in the guilt of an accused if he is suspected of committing
other similar crimes. Evidence of independent crimes
unnecessarily burdens the defendant in his attempt to
overcome the charge against him. It gives opportunity
for conviction upon prejudice instead of competent evidence. Miller v. State (1917), 13 Okl. Crim. 176, 163 P.
131, 43 A.L.R. 2d 868.
The evidence in the instant case shows that the defendant could be identified without the unnecessary introduction of evidence of an independent and unrelated
crime. Mr. Naylor described the person who robbed him
as being approximately five feet ten inches tall, weighing
one hundred sixty pounds, with a voice different from
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that of the general public and .a blood spot in the corner
of his right eye. He also picked the defendant out of the
line-up at the Police Station at noon the day of the
robbery for which the defendant is charged by reason
of his size, voice and the blood spot in his eye. Even
though he so ably identified the defendant he was permitted to testify to circumstances surrounding the crime
of February 11th, a wholly independent and unrelated
crime. In this connection his testimony was contradictory, uncertain and ambiguous. He was not sure that
the defendant wore the same type of clothing when both
robberies occurred (R. 17). He was not certain in his
description of the gun used. In this connection the best
answer he could give was : "I am not sure whether i~
was that gun." (R. 18).
Oliver Nickel was petmitted to testify as to the robbery of the 11th day of February, 1957. He was permitted to so testify even though he was not present at the
time of the robbery for which the defendant is charged.
His testimony adds nothing to the identification of the
accused and was highly prejudicial. The Utah case of
State v. Martin, supra, can be dis.tinguished from the
instant case. In the Mart in case the State was permitted
to introduce evidence of certain letters written by the
defendant for the purpose of identification. The contents of these letter.s clearly indicated that the person
attempting the commission of the robbery was the same
person who allegedly committed the robbery in question
and that it was com1nitted at the sa1ne place and upon
the same person. In Miller v. State, supra, the court
states:
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"If the defendant wrote the letters in question, and the jury found that he did write them,
then the contents of those letters clearly identify
the defendant as the person who committed the
robbery in question."
The evidence offered concerning the crime of February
11th does not consist of statements, written or oral, by
the defendant, and does not clearly identify the defendant as the person who committed the robbery in question.
Because the defendant could be identified without
admitting evidence of a wholly unrelated and independent
crime, and because the evidence admitted concerning this
alleged independent and unrelated crime adds nothin.g
to the identity of the accused, the evidence should have
been excluded, the same being gravely prejudicial to the
defendant.
POINT II.
THE ·COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
CONCERNING A MERCURY AUTOMOBILE AND ITS CONTENTS.

The State was permitted to introduce evidence concerning the ownership of a Mercury automobile and its
contents over the objection of the defendant that the sante
was hearsay. The only evidence offered as to the ownership of the automobile was the testimony of Officer
Burton who said that the name on the sticker was that
of the defendant. This evidence is incompetent for the
reason that it is hearsay and does not come within any
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule and further, no
proper foundation has been laid.
In the case of Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg
(Utah) 315 P. 2d 277, the court admitted testimony about
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the alcoholic content of a blood sample over the objection
of the defendant that no sufficient foundation had been
laid identifying the blood sample analyzed as being the
blood of the defendant, Chugg. This court found that
the admission of said evidence was error. The only evidence introduced was that of the medical technician at
the hospital where Chugg was taken after the accident.
The medical technician did not draw the sample from
Chugg, nor was she present when it was taken. No attempt was made to introduce in evidence the actual specimen of blood allegedly taken from Chugg. The court
stated:
"Clearly there is a lack of necessary evidence
linking the sample analyzed with the blood sample
drawn from Chugg and is therefore insufficient
to identify the blood sample as being that of
Chugg."
In the instant case Officer Burton did not prepare
the sticker found on the automobile, nor was he present
when the same was prepared. There is no evidence as
to who prepared the sticker or when the same was prepared. No attempt was made to introduce into evidence
the sticker or any official record to show the actual owner.ship of the automobile in question. There is not suffi·
cient evidence to link the automobile with the defendant.
The evidence offered consists of the testimony of
an individual concerning what he read from a report of
another, which report consisted of a sticker on an automobile containing the name of an individual. The statements were offered in evidence as proof of the matters
asserted on the sticker, which is an untested assertion
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made out of court and not subject to cross examination.
The evidence is prejudicial to the defendant because
the automobile was found so close to the scene of the
crime and in said automobile a suitcase was found containing two .22 caliber revolvers, both loaded (R. 131).
The revolvers were later admitted in evidence as Exhibits
13 and 14. Again the minds of the jurors were poisoned
by the admission of incompetent and prejudicial evidence.
POINT III.
STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT MADE UNDER
COMPULSION WERE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE.

The court permitted Officer Fillis to testify concerning certain statements made by the defendant while being
interrogated at the Police Station. In this connection
the record is as follows :
"Q.
A.

Did you ask him any

questions~

I asked him how many robberies he had comHe stated 'The one today, and the
one last Monday.'
MR. WOOLLEY: Objected to on the ground
there-that this is going to be in the nature of
a confession, no proper foundation laid.
THE COURT: Overruled.

mitted~

Q.

(Mr. Child) Your answer was two robberies
he had committed~

A.

His answer was two, 'The one today and the
one last Monday.'

Q.

Did you ask him specifically as to what robbery he meant as to last Monday~

A.

I said, 'The Safeway Store,' and he said,
'Yes.'
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I asked him what other robberies he had committed, and he said, 'Just those two.'" (R.
151-152).
There was no proper foundation laid for the admission
of this evidence, further the same was admitted even
though the alleged statements were made under compulsion. Officer Fillis denied making any threats to the
defendant while interrogating him, however, the record
shows without doubt that threatening statements were
made in an effort to induce the defendant to make a
confession.
There are two facts which render a confession inadmissible as evidence. First, one obtained under compulsion, thus violating the defendant's constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, and second, one
made under such circumstances rendering the confession
untrustworthy. When a confession falls within either one
of the above, the law excludes them whether they be
direct confession.s or other declarations tending to implicate a prisoner in the crime charged. Miller v. State,
supra. By the admission of this evidence more poison
was administered to the jury in an effort to black out
justice and deny the defendant the right of a fair and
impartial trial.
CONCLUSION
One of our basic fundan1ental rights under the Constitution of the United States and the State of Utah is
that of a fair and i1npartial trial. Embodied within this
constitutional right is the right to be tried for the crime
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charged and none other, and to be convicted only upon
competent evidence. The trial court in admitting evidence of a wholly unrelated and independent crime, and
admitting hearsay evidence and evidence obtained
through force and threat, erred. The sole effect of the
evidence so admitted was to poison and prejudice the
minds of the jurors against this defendant.
In the interest of substantial justice the conviction
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM S. RICHARDS
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
1007 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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